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Morocco and the EU
1. Introduction
Morocco, like other Mediterranean countries, has concluded an
Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) which should lead
to a free-trade area by the year 2010. It is an agreement where the dominant
partner, the European Union, can safely be assumed to have dictated the
terms. The question then is what benefits Morocco can be expected to reap
from her association with the EU.
In order ta gain an impression of the effects ofMorocco's trade agree-
ments with the EU, it is useful to base ourselves on the insights of two of
the founding fathers of economies, Adam Smith (1723-1790) and David
Rieardo (1772-1823).A summary explanation of their contributions in the
second section, followed by a quiek review of the basics of the welfare
analysis of protection and economie integration in the third section,
should provide us with the necessary taols to assess the pros and cons of
Morocco's association with the EU. The fourth section sketches the rela-
tionship between the EU and Morocco and her neighbours and in the fifth
section the various threads come together when we ask what benefits asso-
ciation with the EU may bring Morocco.
2. The Benefits ofInternational Trade
2.1Scale Economies
In the opening chapter ofThe Wealth ofNations Smith asks himself where




(i) "the skill, dexterity, and judgment with whieh [a country' sJ labour is
generally applied"; and
(ii) "the proportion between the number of those who are employed in
usefullabour, and that of those who are not so employed"
(Smith 1964 p. 1).
The most important variabie, according to Smith, is the first one.
Translated into present-day economic idiom Smith here tells us that con-
sumption, or real income per capita, is dependent on labour productivity.
Smith then goes on to explain labour productivity. This is, in his view, to a
large extent dependent on the division of labour. Labour division enables
people to specialise and to employ machines. Obviously, if total produc-
tion is high, more division oflabour and the use of more machinery is pos~
sible. The heading of Chapter III of the Wealth ofNations is 'That the divi-
sion of labour is limited by the extent of the market' . We might rephrase
this insight as: there are increasing returns ta scale in production. This is
one reason for a country to engage in foreign trade. lts domestic market
will often be too small ta exploit scale economies. The smaller the country,
the more pressing the limitation of market size. This means that interna-
tional trade is particularly important for small countries such as Morocco,
or the Netherlands for that matter. Some industries will have to export in
order ta pro duce on such a scale that scale economies can be exploited.
These industries employ factors of production that are not available for
other industries. Small countries do not have enough factors of production
to produce on a large scale in a great number of industries. The exports
from one industry have to pay for imports of goods from other industries.
Note that a country does not necessarily have to exploit scale
economies itself in order to benefit from them. If another country pro-
duces some partieular good under positive returns to scale, both benefit if
the first country exports its no-scale-economy goods and buys scale-econ-
omy goods from the other country.
2.2 Comparative Advantage
Apart from scale economies, international trade offers benefits of another
kind, sc. the benefits of specialisation in activities in whieh a country is rel-
atively efficient. Scale economies can be exploited even if countries are
identical before engaging in trade, but comparative advantage is dependent
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on differences in productive efficiency between countries. No great intel-
lectual effort is needed to see that all countries can profit from trade if each
country specialises in the production of those goods for which it is the
most efficient producer. Ricardo's great contribution was to show that in-
ternational trade can bring benefits to all participants even if one country is
less efficient than another one in all industries, provided cost relationships
differ. Ricardo's Principles date from 1817,but nearly two centuries later
many politicians and special-interest representatives are still impervious
to his brilliant insights. A trade agreement concluded in November 1995
between Morocco and the EU, for instance, excluded the import of
Moroccan tomatoes into the EU during the month of April, just when
prices are highest (Trouw 1995). Policy makers too often not only refuse to
understand Ricardo, but also fail to see the wis dom of Adam Smith's ob-
servation that "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of aUproduction;
and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it
may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer" (Smith 1964 Book
IV Ch. VIII).
The scale economies story and the comparative advantage model suggest
that worldwide free trade would be optimal for aUcountries concerned and
that we should remove trade restrictions within the shortest possible time.
Though a lot could be said for this idea, we must realise that the models
mentioned above leave out some important variables. One feature, for in-
stance, of the Ricardian model is that it has only one factor of production,
labour, which moves without friction from one industry to another. If we
intro duce more factors of production, or allow for frictions in inter-indus-
try migration, we get a model that can accommodate the fact that some
people may suffer if a country reduces or abolishes barriers to trade.
International trade has an impact on income distribution. If tomatoes from
Morocco can be freely imported into the EU, tomato growers in the EU
will see their margins faU.They wiU put up resistance to a liberalisation of
imports or run to Brussels to ask for subsidies.
The fact that there are not only winners but also losers from trade liber-
alisation goes a long way to explain the existence of trade barriers. Another
factor is fear of unemployment if domestic industries feel the chill wind of
foreign competition. The models in their basic form do not take account of
the adjustrnent costs of a restructuring of production made necessary by
t,
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trade liberalisation, but the victims naturaUy put up resistance. Trade bar-
riers in the form of import tariffs exist, however, also for quite another rea-
son, namely for tax purposes. The perception costs of import tariffs are
likely to be substantially lower than those of an income tax or a turnover
tax and especiaUy poor countries, including Morocco in the early 1980s,
have often coUected some 30% of their total tax income from import tariffs
(Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp 1999). Trade liberalisation thus should ideally
go hand in hand with some compensation for the losers and must often be
accompanied by measures to prevent a worsening of the public finances.
3. Protection and Regional Integration
3.1The Harm Done By ofProtection
Even if a reduction of trade barriers may have negative consequences, there
is a presumption that retaining them works out negatively on welfare.
Protection means that industries that would have to be given up under free
trade are protected against foreign competition and thus can survive. That
also implies that factors of production are bound up in industries for which
a country does not have a comparative advantage. Export industries thus
suffer from protection. They also suffer through another mechanism. If
protection results in a lower demand for foreign goods and thus in a lower
demand for foreign exchange, that may cause the external value of the
country's currency to be higher than it would have been under free trade.
This, again, hurts the export industries. As a result of protection, a coun-
try's production does not take place along the lines of comparative advan-
tage, at the cost oflower real income and consumption.
Further distortions re sult if import tariffs diverge for different goods.
A common phenomenon in rich countries is tarifJ escalation, i.e., higher
import tariffs the higher the degree of processing of a good. Raw materials
often enter industrial countries at a low tariff, but goods at a higher stage of
processing usually carry a higher tariff. This means that the effective tariff
on the more sophisticated stages of manufacturing are higher than the
nominal tariff on the good in question. If, conversely, tariffs do not in-
crease with the degree of processing, effective protection for some stages of
production may weU be negative.
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3.2Regional Integration
After the Second World War the trade barriers put up worldwide during
the 1930S have been partly dismantled, but free trade is still beyond the
horizon. Instead, many countries have resorted to trade liberalisation on a
smaller scale through regional economie integration. Basie customs union
theory has shown that these are not always beneficial to welfare. Trade
may be diverted from an efficient outside supplier to a less efficient union
member. This phenomenon is called trade diversion. It is negative from the
point of view of resource allocation. Trade may, however, also be shifted
from a less efficient third country to a more efficient intra -union provider.
Such trade creation is a positive effect. Whether there is a net gain or a net
loss to the union cannot be established a priori, but third countries will
lose. They see themselves confronted with fewer opportunities to benefit
from international specialisation.
in the region, whieh further stimulates technological development.
Moreover, cu stoms unions may evolve into economie unions, where inte-
gration does not stop at trade policies. In an economie union, common
rules on competition and state subsidies are likely to be adopted and all
kinds of technieal norms and administrative rules will be harmonised ,
which makes intra-union international trade that much easier. Not only
are the costs of adapting produets to the requirements of different markets
reduced, being part of a regional trade agreement, an economie union first
of all, also reduces uncertainty. An important source of uncertainty, sc. the
threat of anti-dumping actions under Article VI of GATT, is removed by
joining an economie union and submitting to its rules as regards competi-
tion policy and subsidies. Economie unions are much more likely to show
net benefits from integration than FTAs. They are more conducive to high-
er growth and thus may have a positive effect on third countries as weIl,
notwithstanding the phenomenon of trade diversion.
If economie integration does not take the form of a customs union, but of a
free trade area (FTA), there is an additional difficulty. Unlike in a customs
union, FTA members retain their own national trade policies. Imports will
tend to enter the FTA through the country with the lowest import tariffs.
A country with a high tariff can only prevent such defiection of trade by
maintaining customs at the borders with its fellow FTA members and re-
quiring certificates of origin stating that the percentage of the value of the
good originating from these member countries exceeds some specific
threshold. This not only entails high administrative costs, but also stimu-
lates fraud. The General Auditor's Office of the European Union, for in-
stance, found out that the imports of orange juice from Israel during one
specific year in the mid-1990S amounted to three times Israel's total pro-
duction (NRC Handelsblad18 November, 1997).The term 'free trade area' is
a misnomer really, as Bhagwati (1995)observed. Trade is far from free in an
FTA and the term 'preferential trade area' would be more fitting.
4. Morocco, the EU and Mediterranean Connections
4.1Morocco and the EU
Cooperation between Morocco and the EU has been a slowand long
drawn-outprocess. Even ifFrance had already, in a protocol annexed to the
1957Treaty of Rome, obtained the right to maintain her preferential trade
arrangements with the Maghreb countries (Bahaijoub 1993 p. 235),bilateral
trade and development cooperation with the EEC progressed only slowly.
Not before 1969 Morocco, together with Tunisia, signed Association
Agreements with the EEC, followed in 1976 by Cooperation Agreements.
These did not amount to much. The Agreements did nothing to refrain the
EEC from resorting to protection in the turbulent period after the first oil
crisis in 1973.The 1969 Association Agreement excluded fresh vegetables
and wine (Pennell 2000 p. 326). Free trade provisions of the 1976
Cooperation Agreements for textiles were later suspended and the
Common Agricultural Policy led to further protection in the EEC
(Bahaijoub 1993 p. 236). Moroccan exports suffered further setbacks with
the accession to the EEC of Greece in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in
1986, whieh led to the introduction of restrictive tariffs on olive oil, wine
and citrus fruit (Pannell20oo p. 358). In reaction, Morocco formally ap-
plied for membership of the EEC in 1987.Itwas not to beoThe EEC was not,
and the EU is not, ready to allow non -European countries in.
Regional trade agreements are sub-optimal from the point of view of statie
resource allocation, but there's more to it than that. First, we have only
looked at differences in production costs without taking account of scale
economies. If regional integration leads to large markets, however, the re-
ward may be scale economies and faster technological development. The
prospect oflarge markets may induce multinational corporations to invest
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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), concluded at a meeting on 27-
28 November 1995 at Barcelona and therefore also dubbed the Barcelona
Process, was intended to make serious work of cooperation at last. It had a
number of fine-sounding objectives, but on the economie side it boiled
down to the intention to create an FTA not only between the EU and the
Mediterranean countries, but also among the Mediterranean countries
themselves, aided by EU financial support. The Euro-Mediterranean Free-
Trade Area should be established by 2010. The Partnership is realised
through Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, whieh provide for
the gradual implementation ofbilateral free tra de in manufactured goods
and the progressive liberalisation of trade in agrieultural products. The
Association Agreement with Morocco was signed on 26 February 1996 and
entered into force on 1 March 2000; negotiations on the liberalisation of
trade in agrieultural products started in January 2002. Quantitative restrie-
tions on industrial goods have been abolished on the EU side, but EU im-
ports of agricultural products are subject to tariff quotas, that limit the
number or volume of goods that can be imported during a certain period
against a certain import tariff. Any excess over this number or volume ei-
ther cannot be imported or only at a higher tariff. Most fisheries products
from Morocco have free entry into the EU, however (WTO 2°°3 pp. 23-
24). As imports ofindustrial goods from the Mediterranean countries into
the EU have been essentially tariff-free since the mid-1970s, the most im-
portant change is that the Mediterranean countries themselves have to lib-
eralise their imports over a period of ten years, whieh is the maximum ad-
justrnent period allowed under the GATT-1994 Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995 pp. 219-220).
AIso, it is agreed in principle that imports of agrieultural and fishery prod-
ucts will be liberalised, but this would require a major change in EU trade
policy as well. Unfortunately, prospects in this area are bleak.
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements do not only aim at
liberalising trade in goods. They also cover trade in services and capital
movements. In addition, they contain provisions on intellectual property
rights, competition policy and state subsidies. This simply means that
Morocco, like the other Mediterranean countries, has no choiee but to
adopt part of the acquis communautaire, the total of EU law and jurispm-
dence. The administrative burden may be high, but the EU provides assis-




Moreover, adopting EU mIes will provide a good deal of protection against
'unfair trade' procedures that might otherwise be started by EU producers
that would feel threatened by freerimports from North Afriean countries.
4-2 Morocco and Other Mediterranean Countries
Morocco is quite open to international trade. Imports and exports together
amount to close to 70 per cent of GOP. In comparison, Outch trade
equalled 110 per cent of GOP in 2000 (CBS 2002). The major part of
Morocco's trade is done with the EU. More than one half of its imports
originate from the EU and exports to the EU even take up three-quarters of
total exports. Trade with her Maghreb neighbours is, however, minimal. In
2000, UMA partners' provided no more than 2.5 per cent ofMorocco's im-
ports and took a measly 1.9 per cent ofMorocco's exports (WTO 20°3 p.
22). Colonial mIe probably has to bear part of the blame for this sorry state
of affairs. Transport and communieation lines (telegraph, postal serviees)
were all orientated toward connections with the colonial power, not with
the neighbours. But after independence there has also been a notabIe lack
of interest in closer trade relations among North Afriean countries. If the
Maghreb would succeed in giving the UMA more body, they could create
an integrated market that would provide much better opportunities for ex-
ploiting scale economies and might attract more foreign direct investrnent.
This has also been recommended by the IMF (IMF 2001 p. 3°, IMF 2003a p.
25). The EU is aware of the problem. Though it has been concluding bilat-
eral agreements with individual Mediterranean countries, it provides fi-
nancial support for countries reforming their fiscal and economie systems
and their industrial sectors in preparation for introducing free trade among
themselves. The Mediterranean countries, however, are under no obliga-
tion to open up for trade among themselves, they only are expected to do
so. One initiative at least has been taken: in January 2°°3 Egypt, Jordan,
Tunisia and Morocco concluded the Agadir agreement. This is a free trade
agreement that can be seen as a first step toward regional integration. lts
value for Morocco will probably be restrieted until Algeria joins the agree-
ment, and its benefits would also most probably be much increased if the
free trade agreement evolved into a customs union.
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5.Association with the EU:What's In It for Morocco
5.1Benefits
Morocco is a poor country. Her GDP per capita in 2000 was only 15.5per
cent of the EU average in PPP terms (purchasing Power Parity; that is, cor-
recting income levels for differences in prices). This is substantially below
the levels of Algeria (23.1per cent) and Tunisia (27.5%)and roughly one-
third of the average income level of the accession countries, the new en-
trants into the EU (Economie Review of EU Mediterranean Partners 2°°3 p.
2; the figure for Tunisia was calculated from World Bank 2002). The figures
may underestimate real income, because there seems to be a sizeable black
economy (The Economist 2000). Nonetheless, Morocco is not a rich coun-
try and with a population close to 3° million people, quite a small econo-
my results. One might wonder whether an association of such a poor and
relatively small economy with a rich trading bloc such as the EU could be
profitable for the poor partner? Trade theory suggests that it certainly can.
And even if association entails costs, the costs ofbeing left out would be far
more serious. Deviation of trade works to the disadvantage of third coun-
tries as weIl as member countries. Moroccan exports were thus seriously
hurt when Greece joined the EEC in 1981and even more when Spain and
Portugal followed in 1986. It was especially products where Morocco can
be expected to have a comparative advantage that bore the brunt, such as
olive oil and other agricultural products, leather goods and textiles. The
Association with the EU will provide Morocco with the opportunity to
compete again on the basis ofits comparative advantage.
In order for the pro fits from economic integration with the EU to ex-
ceed the static reallocation effects emphasised by standard trade and inte-
gration modeIs, the Moroccan economy should avail itself of the opportu-
nities provided by larger markets, including technology imports through
foreign direct investment. This would require, among other things, an
eradication of illiteracy which, with an adult illiteracy rate of 52%in 1999
(World Bank 2002 p. 233), is extremely high. AIso, the quality of public
services should improve and the burden on business from regulations and
red tape could be lightened considerably (Economie Review of EU
Mediterranean Partners, 2003 p 11).For Tunisia estimates have been made
of the potential welfare gains of the association with the EU. These are
gains in the sense of a permanently higher GDP level of 1.7per cent result-
ing from static reallocation effects and a further 2.8 per cent from dynamic
effects (Rutherford et al. 1995, cited in Ghesquiere 1998 pp. 5-6). The gains
are likely to be of the same order of magnitude in Morocco, at least the stat-
ic gains were estimated in the range of 1.5- 2 per cent (Rutherford et al.
1993, cited by Ghesquiere 1998 p. 10). Of course, that such figures are high-
ly dependent on the assumptions made. The estimates of the dynamic
gains in particular are highly speculative. In Tunisia's case, they included
the effects of the harmonisation ofhealth and technical regulations and of
more efficient trading thanks to an upgrading of financial, telecommunica-
tion and transport facilities, but they excluded the effects of the adoption
ofbest practices and technologies from abroad.
Like in other Mediterranean countries, bar Israel, protection in Morocco is
quite high, and much can therefore be gained by trade liberalisation. The
weighted mean import tariff in Morocco was, according to 2002 World
Bank figures, 25.8 per cent, against 1.80 per cent for the EU (Economie
Review of EU Mediterranean Partners, 2°°3 p. 7). This is quite high.
Moreover, the figure does not teIl the whole story. First of aIl, a weighted
import tariff figure is calculated over the goods that have been imported
and cannot take account of the goods that have been kept out as the result
ofhigh tariffs. Note that import tariffs in Morocco may run as high as 339 %
(WTO 2°°3 Statistical Appendix Table AIII.3). Secondly, apart from the
average level of protection, the import tariff system is characterised by
Byzantine complexity. The widely diverging tariff levels for different
goods lead to high protection for some goods, low protection for others,
and possibly negative effective protection for some production processes.
This cannot but have harmful effects on allocative efficiency. Furthermore,
import tariffs are the most visible, but by no means the only import barri-
ers. Apart from import tariffs, there may be quotas, which limit the
amount (or, as the case may be, the value) ofimports of some category, and
tariff quotas. Traders may further be harassed by lengthy and complicated
customs procedures and by corruption on the part of customs officials. It is
thus both tariff and non-tariffbarriers that prevent Morocco reaping the
benefits of international trade to the fullest possible extent. A significant
step in the right direction has been the simplification of customs proce-
dures over the past couple of years. With technical assistance from the
IMF, computerisation has been introduced and the time needed for clear-
ing imported goods has been reduced from two or three days to a few
hours (IMF 2003a p. 17).
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5.2Problems of Association
Under the Association Agreements Morocco is required to lower, and fi-
nally abolish, import barriers on manufactured goods. In order for
Morocco to fully profit from specialisation according to comparative ad-
vantage, the EU should lower, and finally abolish, restrictions on the im-
ports of agricultural products. It is high time that the Common
Agricultural Policy should be liberalised. Unfortunately, European
Agriculture Commissioner Dr Franz Fischler's attempts to subject
European agriculture to a greater degree to market forces, were stymied in
June 2003 by President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder. But if agrarian ex-
ports to the EU still face an uncertain future, the prospects for fishing look
better. In NovembeT1999 the 1996-1999 EU -Morocco agreement allowing
EU fleets in Moroccan waters (against a payment to Morocco of €soo mil-
lion, WTO 2003 p. 78) expired and foreign fleets withdrew. This helped
fish supplies to recover from overfishing, and given overfishing in other
parts of the world, export markets, including in the EU, should not be hard
to find (World Bank 2000). A factor working to the disadvantage of
Morocco is the phasing-out of the Multi Fibre Agreement that should be
completed by 2005. This will require the EU to opel1'its borders for quota-
free textile imports from third countries, which will put Moroccan exports
under pressure. But without the Association Agreement Morocco would
have lost its favoured position as weIl.
The Association Agreement is bound to lead to a restructuring of the
Moroccan economy. Rutherford et al. expect no positive static reallocation
effects for the first five years. First, labour and capital have to be reallocated
over industries. The cost of shifting and retraining labour that have to
move to other industries was estimated by Rutherford et al. to amount to
roughly one year of salary (Ghesquiere 1998 p. 9). Furthermore, there is an
initial unfavourable effect from the sequence of tariff reductions. Tariffs
are reduced first on capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods,
and only later on final goods. This means an increased effective rate of pro-
tection on final goods, which may bind factors of production in some in-
dustries where Morocco does not have a comparative advantage. Such ac-
tivities as assembling heavy goods vehicles may thus receive added protec-
tion for a few years. In 2000, production of some 2000 units was divided
over nine producers (WTO 2003 p. 85). None can have been very efficient.
The present tariff structure discourages the production of semi-finished
products, where Morocco may have a comparative advantage (WTO 2003
p. x; the Statistical Appendix provides detailed information on the tariff
structure). Phasing out import tariffs thus may help Morocco in the end to
specialise in conformity with its comparative advantage, but during the
adjustment period costly misallocation is possible.
Another problem to be solved is how to compensate for the loss of tar-
iff revenue resulting from liberalisation of imports. In 2000, Morocco
earned 4.8% of GDP, or 17.9%of government revenue, from import tariffs
(IMF 2003b p. 18). This will be substantially reduced if imports are liber-
alised and either other taxes will have to be raised or tax perception will
have to be improved.
5J Problems Arising From Other Agreements
The Association Agreement aims at the creation of an FTA. Trade between
Morocco and the EU will thus be saddled with the need to provide certifi-
cates of origin. Complications are bound to multiply now that Morocco is
not only involved in trade agreements with the EU but also with the
United States. Morocco also has concluded a trade agreement with the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA, made up of Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway and Switzerland) in 1997,which entered into force on 1December
1999. This agreement is similar to the association agreement with the EU
and thus is likely to cause fewer problems, even if the four EFTA countries
follow their own agricultural policies. There are, furthermore, preferential
trade arrangements with Algeria, Guinea, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, Saudi
Arabia and Senegal and bilateral free-trade agreements with Egypt, Jordan
and Tunisia, apart from the Agreement on Facilitation and Development of
Trade among Arab Countries, an agreement concluded among the mem-
bers of the Arab League on 19 February 1997 which entered into force on 1
January 1998 (IMF 2001 Box 3, WTO 2003 p. 22). Moroccan goods further-
more enter a number of markets partially or wholly tariff-free under the
Generalized System ofPreferences (GSP), whereas it is one of the 48 devel-
oping countries offering each other tariff preferences under the Global
System ofTrade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP). To top
it off, in 2003 a framework agreement on a Trade. Preferences System
among Islamic countries entered into force (WTO 2003 pp. viii, 25-26).
It would in such circumstances be very attractive for Moroccan traders
to try and import goods from a partner in one FTA and sell these to a part-
372 373
ner in another FTA. The latter would, however, do its utmost to prevent
this deflection of trade. Oisputes over certificates of origin are likely to be-
come the order of the day. Things may get very complicated if goods im-
ported from a partner in one trade bloc are used in the production of goods
exported to partners in another bloc. With specialisation in international
trade more and more taking place along the lines of production processes
rather than produets, it willl become even more difficult to profit fully
from one's comparative advantage. Morocco will, for instanee, be able to
pro duce clothing or assembie consumer electronics for the EU market only
using raw materials and semi-finished produets from the EU, not from
other markets.
A higher degree of economie integration with the other Maghreb coun-
tries would be a useful complement to increasingintegration with the EU,
as it would make the whole Maghreb region more attractive as alocation
for FOI. Free trade with other Mediterranean countries at least is stimulat-
ed by the EU, as the agreements with Tunisia and Morocco allow cumula-
don of rules of origin for trade with Mediterranean countries with which
they conclude free trade agreements. This means that the EU will not put
obstacles in the way of imports from Tunisia and Morocco if a substantial
part of value added originates from other Mediterranean countries.
whole series ofFTAs. It is a matter for regret, finally, that the EU shows lit-
de sign of allowing Morocco to exploit her comparative advantage in agri-




Association does not mean full integration and it seems that antidumping
actions ean still be taken by the EU. This will act as a brake on investment,
but on the whole it appears that Association with the EU offers many po-
tential benefits to Morocco. Only in order to realise these benefits,
Morocco will have to tackle a number of serious problems, prominent
amongst them the low level ofliteracy and the burden of the government
bureaucracy. A few years ago Morocco had 75°.000 civil servants, whose
wages took 12%of GOP, and there were no less than 41 ministries, among
which four education ministries (The Economist 2000). Without doubt, il-
literacy needs to be addressed, but one wonders whether four ministries
really provide an efficient solution. Furthermore, even if the Association
Agreement provides for much more harmonisation of policies than is usu-
al in FTAs, it remains an FTA. Full participation in international trade will
be hampered by the need to produce certificates of origin at borders, a
problem that is made more complicated by Morocco's participation in a
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